A further complication was the practice of subcontracting. Political scientist Swati Srivastava notes that “a federal contract can go through as many as three layers of subcontracts,” while “companies can refuse to publicly disclose subcontractors for proprietary reasons.” When those four Blackwater employees were killed in Fallujah, it took years for a Congressional oversight committee to determine who had hired them in the first place, eventually finding that Blackwater had been subcontracted by Halliburton. Subcontracting also enabled a stunning prevalence of graft, as the federal government often paid twice for a single contract.

Military contracting in Iraq demonstrates nearly all the shortcomings of relying on private actors to execute a state’s foreign policy. Armed contractors like Blackwater allowed violence to be wielded on behalf of the United States with impunity. Atrocities were committed in the name of the American people without accountability, shielded by the derivative sovereignty afforded to federal contractors. The use of military contractors also allowed the federal government a degree of plausible deniability, insulating it from political consequences. These were not American military personnel, and therefore their conduct was often treated as secondary to the conflict at large—despite the majority of US personnel on the ground being private citizens. Obfuscation for the sake of “national security” led to a lack of regulatory oversight and the mismanagement of federal funds, primarily benefiting firms like Blackwater and Halliburton. Once again, the public-private partnership is a two-way street, and one wonders who is the principal and who is the agent in this relationship.

America has not experienced a “Prigozhin moment,” and it is laughable to imagine Erik Prince crossing the Potomac as though it were the Rubicon. However, mutiny is not the only reason Machiavelli cautions against dependence on mercenaries. One of the enduring lessons of The Prince is that conquest by virtue is far preferable to conquest by fortune—or by the virtues of others. While it is more difficult to rise to power through one’s own skill and resources, Machiavelli notes that self-sufficiency makes for more effective and secure rule. Dependence on the capacities of others may initially seem easier, but it produces a vulnerable prince unlikely to survive. An empire of contractors is eating the foundations of the American state from within. Advocates for the privatization of governmental functions insist that market competition leads to efficiency and innovation. In practice, selling off the state’s monopoly on violence to self-interested actors has undermined the American national interest. Not only is the American public insulated from the consequences of interventionist foreign policy as casualty numbers are deflated and responsibilities deflected onto contractors, but the influence these private actors hold over US engagements abroad is steering the state toward ruin. Just as neoliberalism hollowed out the welfare state, it is now hollowing out the warfare state by substituting market logic for public responsibility in the use of force. If America cannot carry out military interventions without the assistance of external contractors, perhaps the “imperial hat” is best left at home.