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  • Thai baht surge sends shockwaves through economy

    PATTAYA, Thailand – The Thai baht has surged to its strongest level in more than four years, unsettling exporters, tourism operators, and farmers alike. Analysts warn that the speed and scale of the currency’s appreciation could cause deeper and longer-lasting damage than policymakers had anticipated.

    On September 9, the baht briefly touched 31.58 per U.S. dollar before easing to 31.74 later in the day, according to Kasikorn Research Center. Since the start of the year, the currency has gained 7.5 percent, making it one of the strongest performers in Asia. The rally has been fueled by a combination of a weaker U.S. dollar—down nearly 10 percent this year under political pressure on the Federal Reserve during Donald Trump’s presidency—rising global gold prices, and heavy foreign capital inflows into Thai bonds. Thailand’s significant gold reserves, together with speculative flows into local markets including cryptocurrency, have further boosted demand for baht.

    The appreciation is rattling the country’s export-reliant economy. Thanakorn Kasetsuwan, president of the Thai National Shippers’ Council, described exporters as “shocked” by how quickly the baht moved from 34 to 32 per dollar within just a few months. He explained that every one-baht gain wipes out roughly 10 million baht in export value. For example, a $10 million shipment that would have been worth 340 million baht at an exchange rate of 34 now yields only 320 million at 32—a loss of 20 million baht, or 5.8 percent, on the same order. While large corporations can hedge against this volatility, most small- and medium-sized exporters cannot, leaving them exposed to significant losses.

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    The tourism industry, which has welcomed more than 22 million foreign visitors so far this year and generated over 1 trillion baht in revenue, is equally concerned. Thienprasith Chaiyapatranan, president of the Thai Hotels Association (THA), warned that a strong baht makes Thailand appear expensive compared with regional rivals. Tourists may not cancel their trips outright, but they are spending less. With fixed travel budgets, a stronger baht translates into fewer restaurant meals, less shopping, and fewer excursions. Although the upcoming high season may temporarily mask these effects, the longer-term picture is troubling as competitors like Vietnam and Japan—where the yen has fallen dramatically—become more attractive. Farmers, too, are feeling the strain. Revenues from rice and field crop exports have been cut even as domestic costs continue to rise. The result is a squeeze on rural producers who already operate on thin margins, deepening financial pressure in the agricultural sector.


> Business leaders are calling for urgent intervention. The Thai Chamber of Commerce has described the current situation as a “currency shock that runs counter to the real economy,” urging the government and the Bank of Thailand to act before competitiveness erodes further. The Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking has gone so far as to recommend separating Thailand’s gold balance sheet from its core economic indicators, arguing that gold-related inflows distort the real strength of the baht. At the same time, officials are cautious, knowing that overly aggressive intervention could risk accusations of “currency manipulation,” particularly from the United States, which has linked exchange-rate issues to trade negotiations.

    Kasikorn Research believes the baht could soon test the 31.50 per dollar level if U.S. interest rate cuts go ahead, with the next support point seen at 31.30. Few expect it to return to the historic peak of 30 baht per dollar reached in 1978, as the central bank is expected to quietly intervene to prevent excessive gains.

    Yet the warning signs are already visible. Kriangkrai Thiennukul, chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), has stressed that the sharpest rally in four years is damaging exporters, tourism operators, and small businesses across the board. While cheaper imports such as oil offer some relief, the net effect is decidedly negative. If the baht continues to appreciate independently of economic fundamentals, he said, Thailand risks losing its competitive edge.

    For policymakers, the paradox is stark. A strong baht is often hailed as a sign of investor confidence, but its rapid and excessive rise is inflicting real pain on the ground. Exporters are losing contracts, tourists are spending less, and farmers are taking losses they cannot pass on. With a new finance minister and central bank governor preparing to take office, the business community is urging swift action. Unless the baht is managed more carefully, Thailand could be left with a currency that looks strong on paper while the real economy weakens beneath it.


  • There was this trending infographic on social media showcasing attempted color revolutions and general social instabilities of neighbouring countries surrounding China.

    The notable countries that have not yet fallen into this being Mongolia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia.

    I can’t comment much on the rest but let’s take a quick look at some statistics for Malaysia to see if the country has potential.

    Unemployment rate: 3.0% (About a decade low)

    Youth unemployment: 10.2%

    2025 1H GDP Growth: 4.4%

    Headline Inflation: Jul 2025, 1.2%, monthly YoY peak at 1.7% for 2025

    And apparently >70% of the assets related to the infamous 1MDB corruption scandal has been recovered.

    And of course: Nepal, US turmoil a reminder for Malaysia, says Anwar

    Anwar reminded Malaysians that unity is the foundation of a nation’s peace which, in turn, drives economic development and the overall wellbeing of its citizens, Utusan Malaysia reported.

    “Compared to many other countries, we are far better off,” he said.

    “For example, in Nepal, there are riots everywhere … a minister was stripped, and his wife burned to death.

    “Just two days ago, there was a shooting involving a leader at a university in the US.

    “So let us pray that we can continue to preserve peace and unity,” he said when officiating an event in Iskandar Puteri, Johor, today.

    … Don’t let development erode what truly matters,” he said.

    “We may build malls and industries and record high profits, but if we ignore issues like income, housing, welfare and education, we destroy our values and morals in the process.”

    Had to avoid commenting on Indonesia because of diplomacy it seems.

    “Other countries are worse and so we should just be glad”. A classic.


  • I don’t know enough to give a confident answer about the particular politics but I can give a general picture.

    I think there is just a lack of organization, or in other words, a concrete movement that are able to organise around class and apply any semblance of pressure in Indonesia. As much as it has experienced some level of industrialization, it suffers from this top-down level push and so ultimately the economy suffers from uneven development and there is no consensus being built to actually holistically build up the productive forces for example. It’s emblematic of a lot of Global South development, where conventional wisdom suggests a technocratic elite is all is needed for a country to be successful. You just need the technical know-how of industrial capitalism, they say, but without considering the underlying mass organisation needed to protect it from imperialist attack. That’s why financialization and rentierism (mislabelled as “corruption”) has sunken its teeth into many SEA economies.

    Jokowi’s reign was quiet on the media end, but many of the Indonesia’s problems, whether economic, or national/ethnic/religious, still boils under the surface, just like in India or Nigeria. I am unsure if the distinction and description you provided between the two presidents is fully justified, but ultimately, to be an annoying communist, it’s because of capitalism.

    I’ll refer to an article by Arah Juang, that published articles in both Indonesian and English.

    The People Are Strangled by Taxes! The Political Elite’s Privileges Are Skyrocketing! Crush the Political Elite!

    The Prabowo-Gibran regime continues Jokowi’s accelerated remilitarization efforts. In general, Indonesia’s political elites have a weak faith in democracy and are cowardly in confronting the military. The 1998 Reformation, or democratic transformation against militarism, was incomplete. Political elites, including the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and others, betrayed the 1998 Reformation. The ABRI faction was abolished, but many other elements remained, from extra-territorial commands to various military businesses and companies.

    The strengthening of militarism also served to protect this policy of allocating power. Similarly, various new legal instruments were created to support it, such as the RKUHP (Criminal Code), the RKUHAP (Procedural Code), the TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) Bill, and policies related to general elections. Meanwhile, various legal instruments were created to strengthen the distribution of economic power to political elites, such as the Job Creation Law, the Minerba Law, and so on.

    …Protest after protest that continuously erupted. August 13, 2025, Pati residents held a large-scale movement, organised by the United Pati Community Alliance, in front of the Regent’s Office. They demanded the cancellation of the PBB-P2 or Rural and Urban Area, and,  Land and Building Tax  increase and the removal of the Regent’s position. Tax protests then spread to other areas, with demonstrations occurring in at least Bone, Cirebon, and Cianjur.

    On August 25, protests began in major cities, primarily protesting high taxes and the privileges gained by members of the House of Representatives (DPR). Demonstration took place in Medan, Jakarta, Pontianak, and Surabaya.

    Regarding the issue of democracy in Papua, on August 27, 2025, Sorong residents organized a demonstration at the Sorong Police Headquarters. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) deployed 150 personnel, including two armored vehicles, to the protest site. Police sprayed the crowd with tear gas.  By the end of the demonstration, at least 12 Sorong residents were arrested and several demonstrators were injured. Authorities also shot a motorcycle taxi driver who was inspecting conditions on Jalan Sudirman.

    …The readiness and accuracy of a revolutionary organization in responding to and leading such movement do not depend on its spontaneity but rather on the constructed historical character of that revolutionary organization. Which includes the correctness of its struggle program, its ideological perspective, and the traditions of leadership cultivated within the organization. If a revolutionary organization is built on the basis of only promoting normative issues or simply participating in actions, it is will likely get trapped in merely follow the steps of spontaneous movements. Likewise, if a revolutionary organization becomes stuck only theory work without ever practicing leadership, it will struggle to provide leadership in spontaneous movements. It is precisely during this non-revolutionary period that the work of building a revolutionary organization becomes crucial and important as it will be too late to build once the movement, uprise, or revolutionary situation occurs.

    By then, the revolutionary organization must be in a state of readiness to launch action at any moment. This is a situation where something that took years to build can drastically change in a few days or even hours. However, to be tactically flexible, one must truly possess what can be called tactics. Without a strong revolutionary organization,  tested in political struggle across all situations and times, it is impossible for a systematic action plan to be considered a tactic. Tactics must be guided by strong principles and executed steadfastly, qualities derived from a strong and tested revolutionary organization.

    Said Iqbal’s alignment with the authorities was displayed during May Day when he gave access Prabowo to speak, hold hands, and danced with workers. Said Iqbal’s statement misdirect the blame and perpetrators of the violence. Workers themselves have repeatedly experienced violence from political elites. The labor movement was sabotaged by the New Order military regime, as well as labour movements being attacked, as seen in the history of Omah Buruh and Saung Buruh. In essence, the state of these political elites is a tool of violence against workers and the people. There, resistance against them, including the use of violence, is a method of struggle for workers and the people.

    Various groups often categorized as “civil society”– such as NGOs and several yellow unions, as well as students and Indonesian diaspora alumni, have adopted a reformist stance against the current radicalization of the people’s movement. They hope that Prabowo, the House of Representatives (DPR), the National Police (Polri), and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to remember they represent the people’s voice, obey the rule of law, stop repressive behavior, demand transparency, accountability.  Their rhetoric often culminates in intellectualised pleas ending with slogans like: “We Are Waiting. Prove The People”s Voices Are Heard.” These citizens or “civil society” actors seek change through strict adherence to the law and the rules set by political elite.

    … Indeed, we must not be naive, assuming that political elites, regardless of faction, or even imperialist, regardless of country, will simply sit idly by. They will do everything in their power to ensure the movement aligns with their own interests, from outright massive repression to exploiting labor and co-opting people’s movements.This exploitation can be achieved through propaganda in the mass media and through infiltration of organizations and mass demonstrations. To some extent, they may benefit from the struggle for democratization. For example, regional political elites rejoiced the 1998 Reformation because it created opportunities for them to gain power in the regions after the fall of Suharto’s centralised militaristic regime.

    The 1998 Reformation also demonstrated a similar trend: political elites, particularly those “outside” the New Order military regime, jostled for power by exploiting the 1998 Reformation for their own gain. However, the struggle for democratization ultimately benefits workers and the people. The more complete the struggle, the stronger the workers and the people confronting the political elites. While, the political elites will consistently uphold the historical waste such as militarism.

    The article goes on and I do recommend giving it a full read.


  • Algeria-Malaysia relations?

    I figured all you nerds would actually be interested in this and gives me an excuse to delay a write-up for a much more domestically contentious topic, Malaysia-Israel ‘relations’.

    This came about after perusing through passportindex.org and reading an article in Middle East Critique on Saudi Arabia-Cuba relations a few weeks ago, which made me think a lot about the role of small and medium state diplomacy in multipolarity.

    I was scrolling the passport index web-page, looking through various countries and comparing as it were. This made me realize something: firstly, Algeria, the 10th largest country by surface area, really doesn’t grant many countries visa-free access. Looking through the highest ranked passports, including Singapore and UAE, they both don’t have visa-free access to Algeria.

    Something was amiss. I had to use the website’s “destination feature”.

    And lo and behold:

    read...or don't.

    Outside of the countries in the Maghreb and Sahel, the 2 (!) other countries in green are Seychelles and Malaysia! Quite an odd combination - perhaps Algeria’s hidden gambit for Indian Ocean control?

    A visit to the website of the Algerian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur proves fascinating.

    In the first line, on a page titled “Historical Background”:

    Algeria opened its Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1993. Relations between Algeria and Malaysia are excellent.

    It’s apparently excellent! Never in my life have I heard any utterance with these two countries together, but I guess I have been missing out. Other parts of the website seems lively and functional.

    Still, I have to ask myself, to what honour does Malaysia have to get elusive visa-free access to Algeria? (and to some extent vice-versa, although Malaysia is quite open towards visitors.)

    Taking a quick look at the history, and the culprit is, of course, Mahathir. For all the good and bad in this country, it seems all roads always lead to him.

    In a speech he made in 2003 Algiers:

    Malaysia is very keen to have a stronger presence in the Northern African region. This is in line with the effort to encourage Malaysian businesses to tap the potential for trade among South countries which has not been explored to the fullest.

    It is recognised that Algeria is the second largest country in Africa after Sudan with a population of 32.3 million, which is larger than the 24 million population of Malaysia. Algeria is Malaysia’s second largest trading partner in Northern Africa, with trade in 2002 amounting to 116.1 million U.S. Dollars. Malaysia’s exports to Algeria in 2002 was 113.6 million U.S. Dollars and imports was 2.5 million U.S. Dollars, a gross imbalance which needs to be addressed.

    Alongside the neoliberal hits he was known for

    …This is to ensure that the private sector can continue to be the primary engine of economic growth. Through the Malaysia-Incorporated Policy which has been adopted more than a decade ago, we are able to create a smart partnership between the government and private sector to achieve mutual benefit and help develop our country.

    But alas that has been the common thread of Malaysian foreign policy. Mired with contradictions of history.

    Despite its putative allure, a closer reading of Mahathir’s Malaysia, its position and its relationships with globalisation will reveal not a rejection of globalisation in toto but a rather more selective engaged relationship with globalisation. Its economic agenda remains wedded to an open and globalised economy and yet, it combines a syncretic mix of structuralism, modernization and dependency theories and a dose of neo-colonialist discourses. Intended to reintroduce agency and space back into the closed frameworks and representational categories of a globalising (and somewhat universalizing) trend, Malaysia’s strategies have shown us states are still relevant and that we can (re)discover, reaffirm and articulate our own agency, build and develop alternative ‘local’ practices and resources as we engaged with the contours of global capitalism. - Mahathir, Malaysia and Globalisation: Challenging Orthodoxy

    But going back to the topic at hand, we have to ask ourselves, again, why visa-free?

    A quick glance at the OEC site showcases unremarkable trade statistics.

    Recent news does seem quite optimistic:

    Malaysia, Algeria sign deal to develop mining industry 2025/06/18

    Malaysia and Algeria have officially launched a strategic industrial cooperation project worth 8 billion USD, backed by Malaysia’s Lion Group, marking a major step forward in bilateral ties and ushering in a new development phase for Algeria’s mining sector.

    Algeria, Malaysia have made significant progress in bilateral ties – Ambassador 2022/11/02

    Maandi explained that the Algerian new investment law, approved recently by the government, which aims at attracting foreign investors and improving its business climate, would certainly encourage Malaysian investors to look for investment opportunities and do business in Algeria.

    Or could it possibly be Malaysian and Algerian Islamic histories of post-colonial regrets and complicated labour and settler colonial migrations that had struck a chord.

    Sénac’s vision of Algeria as ‘a raceless culture,’ a multicultural and plural society tolerant and acceptant of its diversity, would be deeply frustrated by Ben Bella’s turn toward ‘Arabization’ and ‘Islamization’ as the new authentic poles of Algerian identity. As Algeria turned more exclusively toward the type of Arab nationalism promoted by Nasser, Sénac’s disenchantment with the country’s betrayal of its pluralistic identity became more and more visible in his poetry: ‘I love you—but wait, I am speaking to the void! I gave up my love to the cicadas of Europe. I gave up everything—Revolution!—for what? A rolling dune without a mirage to rest his head on! - Re-remembering Third Worldism: An Affirmative Critique of National Liberation in Algeria

    Compare that to Malaysia, a country 10,000km away.

    By now, the Salafization of Malaysian Islam seems to be beyond doubt, barring a future resurgence of traditionalist ulama who are able to provide a convincing counter narrative and at the same time strategically attempt a capture of the commanding heights of Malaysia’s power centres. Discomfort expressed in public forums about “Arabization” is symptomatic of Wahhabi-Salafi categories increasingly defining the terrain of Malay-Muslim society through the use of terms that are decontextualizing, dehistoricizing and deculturating (cf. Koya 2015; Zahiid 2016). - The Extensive Salafization of Malaysian Islam

    Perhaps, one day I can knock the door of the Embassy and get a response directly from the source.

    Regardless, this quiet diplomacy continues and we go on about our lives.

    Some works I have referenced are behind pay-walls. I can personally share if requested, although would like suggestions for which sites to upload them on.


  • Regarding this part, didn’t Mahathir (and I believe, Anwar, back then when he was a zealot) suppressed and eliminated nearly all of the Malay-centric labor movements back in the 1980s?

    In Malaysia by the 70s and 80s, trade unions were dominated by Malays and Indians, mainly in the public sector, and Mahathir in particular sought to control these unions by introducing collaborators in their leaderships. However unions were already past their peak radicalization, which was prior to our independence back in the 40s and 50s. They were moribund through British colonial onslaught and lawfare from the “Malayan Emergency” when the Communist Party of Malaya was waging guerrilla warfare. Thus, labour unions are systemically weak in Malaysia, with unionisation rates below that of the USA, and with class collaborationist leadership.

    In the 1980s, most of the Malay population still were not completely proletarianised. Malays were composed of mostly rural peasantry and some urban semi-proletarians and proletarians. In 1980, Malays (and other indigenous groups) constituted only around ~55% of the total population with 38% of that being urban. The statistics are a bit fuzzy but realistically if unionization rates in 1980 were at 17% of the total workforce, with about ~50% of that being Malay members, that meant that you couldn’t even say a neoliberal ‘deunionization’ crash happened like in the USA or UK. Historically though, trade unions weren’t ever Malay dominated, and for those that were, and were large like CUEPACS, the leadership was less radical than even the MTUC.

    I think the classic Marxist-Leninist critique of trade unions still applies for most unions in Malaysia. They have never been a catalyst for larger positive change in postcolonial times because the Left itself has been so weak to leverage and channel union power.

    See From a popular labour movement to a top-down managed organisation and The state and organised labour in West Malaysia, 1967–1980.


  • A couple weeks back @xiaohongshu@hexbear.net asked me about the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and I was a bit too brief about the party and why any genuine scientifc socialist would not ever rally behind the party so I’m here to rectify it.

    At first I would like to highlight a 2 part article that holistically addresses the party, in which I will also quote heavily from with further commentary below.

    Kit Siang and DAP – a response to Lim Teck Ghee

    DAP and a multiracial Malaysia – a response to Lim Teck Ghee

    The main issue that the Malaysian Left grapples with today is that the “left” in this country are chauvinists. In other words, they themselves perpetuate racialism and deradicalized “socialism”. This has been persistent issue since the start of the 20th century. For reasons that have been extensively discussed by many here, communist and socialist politics (in form) never took root outside Chinese and Indians. This meant Malays, but also large parts of other ethnic groups, whether Orang Asal or even mixed Peranakans.

    This then sets the stage for the DAP, the favourite scapegoat for some parts of the mainstream elite, who continuously accuses them of being Chinese communists. The problem is of course that the DAP itself has never strayed too far from the neoliberal mainstream even as the “key opposition” of “Malay supremacy”. (Quick note, it is often translated as “supremacy” but ‘Ketuanan’ also is commonly translated to “dominance” or “premiership”).

    Kit Siang [the leader of DAP for most of it’s life] has been a dominant figure in the DAP for a number of reasons. One, it had the support of the urban Chinese voters in the urban Chinese belt stretching from Perak to Negeri Sembilan and with pockets of Chinese support in Melaka and Johor.

    …He was able to articulate the Chinese electoral concerns in a forthright manner, in some cases openly courting a Chinese chauvinist line, both inside and outside the Dewan Rakyat [parliament] and as an editor of the Rocket from 1965-1969.

    …The Malay chauvinism was countered by the blunt Chinese chauvinism of DAP. This was despite DAP’s lip service for a democratic and socialist Malaysia

    No party in the current coalition are truly anti-racialism. Even for the “progressives”. That is the nature of bourgeois parliamentarianism.

    …Teck Ghee falls into the same trap that Kit Siang has made for himself, a pretence of DAP’s multiracialism and then hidden undercurrent of unadulterated Chinese chauvinism. There is no point in making passing references to the late Karpal Singh to show that DAP has non-Chinese credentials.

    … There were no Chinese legal firms that were courageous or competent to take the legal briefs from DAP. If they were, I am sure DAP would have turned to them. There was none forthcoming and hence that relationship was a relationship of convenience, between Karpal and (now his family’s legal business) and DAP.

    The superstructure of the Chinese capitalist economy in Malaysia is an important consideration to know here. It involves clan associates, paternal relationships, conscious disengagement with other ethnic groups and in a lot of aspects, right-wing Chinese nationalism. This is because the 1949 Chinese revolution, or even a 1966 cultural revolution, never took place in this country.

    Instead, Chinese capital became a useful “opposition” of Malaysian capitalism, in which race becomes the focal point instead of class struggle. This is why of the top 50 richest people in Malaysia, 48 are Chinese. This is where you get stories of Chinese landlords refusing rent to non-Chinese people.

    The usual rant about discriminatory NEP and discrimination has outlived its political usefulness as an intellectual narrative. The questions now posed are what did DAP do when it was in power? Not just in Penang or some of the states where it shared power, but at the federal level when it was in power, albeit briefly.

    This can be said even more now that the DAP forms a large part of the unity government in power. Just recently, a member of DAP argued for a two-tier minimum wage structure between migrant workers and citizens. I guess this is the bare truth of their slogan “Malaysian Malaysia”.

    In the end, class struggle continuously remains the only avenue for anyone seeking for genuine anti-racism and social justice. “Multiculturalism”, in actuality, remains to be bourgeois social contract theory, lacking the scientific materialist outlook necessary for revolutionary and lasting social change.


  • Semi-related, since it’s been a while I followed Malaysian politics, but how is the new Anwar government doing compared to the previous BN rule?

    It’s not as straight-forward. Basically PH gained power after the 2018 elections but was based on a tricky coalition with certain smaller parties. After the so-called “Sheraton move” in 2020 which involved many members in the ruling coalition defecting to the opposition thereby disrupting the tenuous majority in parliament, lead to PN gaining power with help from BN for 1.5 years.

    This temporary alliance was then also beset with problems that lead to the 2022 snap elections. But the problems didn’t stop there because the results again saw a deadlock in which the 3 main coalitions, PH, BN and PN unable to secure a majority of the parliamentary seats. After negotiations, PH finally rose to power with Anwar appointed as PM, with BN supporting his candidacy.

    Outside the political spectacle, the government has continued it’s neoliberal trajectory for nearly 4 decades, for example the privatisation of public healthcare and corporatization of GLCs for profit-maximisation. The government has recently given a cash handout of 100RM (~170CNY), a populist measure to dampen the discontent many people on the ground feel despite official statistics of very low inflation. A clear band-aid that does not solve the structural issues that are facing the economy,

    As a result, there has been a lot of disappointment within the activist-NGO circuit, even for the NED funded ones, who were hoping for larger reforms that failed to materialize.

    I know that the socdem DAP has been completely neoliberalized, are there any left wing forces within the Pakatan coalition government these days?

    The socdem DAP has never really escaped it’s “democratic socialist” identity which stands in stark contrast to anti-imperialist Communism and Marxism - from it’s beginnings (as the Malaysian branch of Singapore’s PAP) to it’s current formulation. Although I would admit, it has probably drifted definitively into the neoliberal camp for decades at this point.

    I’ve mentioned this before but Malaysia has no existing parliamentary party that is willing to decisively break from neoliberal politics. Malaysia has heavily suppressed and disempowered mass movements that face multiple contradictions upon multiple axes, in which ever since the 80s the Left has never really recovered in terms of popularity and mobilisation. There are perhaps a handful of parties and organizations I can name that truly fit the Left label, but regardless it’s going to be a long road with no straightforward path before a credible Left alternative will rise.

    My understanding is that Anwar himself used to be the NED candidate and supported by the US during his political imprisonment by Mahathir, so he’s very much a neoliberal, but has since “rebranded” himself as a repentant opposition leader.

    Anwar’s history is mired with complications that go beyond just his NED and Westward-facing smiles. To call him “the” NED candidate simplifies the political situation, which in my opinion is like calling Putin a comprador in 2005. In some regards that is true, but material reality limit a colour revolution style capture of the Malaysian political scene.

    Anwar Ibrahim’s first rise to power was through an Islamic activist current in the 70s and 80s, with ideological affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood. His disagreement with Mahathir and subsequent detainment, and extensive engagements within the policy-making circles in the USA is well-known, but consistent with the Malaysian political scene, he does not fall into the classic US-funded comprador politician found in other Global South countries. Because that would be a case of self-inflicted harm that disrupts his own class interests, and I have to give props for the ruling classes here in maintaining some level of cohesion and not committing suicide through US involvement (moreso than it already has).

    A fun fact that I also forgot until I was reminded of recently was that Anwar Ibrahim actually proposed to revive the Mahathir’s old ideas of the Asian Monetary Fund 2 years ago.

    I think the best way I can describe Anwar Ibrahim’s positions is that he is a product of internal contradictions within the Malaysian political economy as much as the international contradictions. In a way he represents a “new normal” of multipolar neoliberal capitalism where the old is still in the process of giving into the new.


  • The title is a bit of a mouthful but the relatively short substack post (from the many I follow) serves as a useful tool in linking classic modern Marxist concepts and literature with current news pages in the context of Malaysia

    Neoliberalism-as-Neo-Imperialism: Post-13MP Constraints, Economic Dependency, and the Entrenchment of Oligarchy in Malaysia

    2nd August 2025

    Introduction: Neoliberalism Reloaded in the 13th Malaysia Plan

    Malaysia’s 13th Malaysia Plan (13MP) was heralded as a forward-looking framework to guide the country through economic recovery and structural reform. However, its implementation remains deeply constrained by a global order where neoliberalism, under the guise of liberalised trade and tech optimism, acts as a contemporary form of neo-imperialism. This essay draws from Samir Amin’s theory of unequal exchange, dependency theory, and Gramscian analyses of hegemony to frame Malaysia’s structural vulnerabilities—perpetuated by ethnocapital alliances, comprador capital, and collusion with Global North monopoly-finance capital.

    remainder
    1. Unequal Exchange and the Myth of Reciprocal Trade Gains

    “Trade is not development, especially if it transfers value upwards.” — Samir Amin

    Malaysia’s trade diplomacy was recently celebrated with the United States reducing its reciprocal tariff rate from 25% to 19%—a move framed as a diplomatic win. However, as clarified in the MITI statement, critical export sectors such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are already exempt from new tariffs. Hence, there is no new material gain in terms of value-add or market expansion.

    Key Argument: This scenario exemplifies unequal exchange, where the Global South (Malaysia) continues to export labor-intensive intermediate goods at low prices while importing high-value technology at inflated costs—creating a structural transfer of surplus to the Global North.

    Reference: Samir Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

    Further Source: MITI Trade Statement (July 2025)

    1. Comprador Capital and State-Enabled Tech Colonialism

    Malaysia’s digital economy push, while ostensibly progressive, is underwritten by state-backed incentives to Big Tech platforms like Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Meta, and Amazon AWS. These corporations receive tax holidays, land grants (particularly in Johor and Cyberjaya), and preferential tariffs for electricity and water—subsidised by public spending.

    Key Argument: Comprador technocrats within Malaysia’s GLC ecosystem facilitate this “digital rent extraction” in return for elite brokerage. The rakyat, meanwhile, face increasing cost of living, inflation, and underinvestment in public digital infrastructure.

    Reference: Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, “Eliminate the Culture of Worshipping Wealth,” NUS Southeast Asian Centre, 2023.

    Data Point: Electricity subsidy expenditure, MOF 2024 report.

    Relevant Concept: Sweezy & Baran’s Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review, 1966.

    1. Ethnocapital Clientship and the Preservation of Oligarchy

    Economic policy implementation under the 13MP remains tightly bound to ethnocapital alliances, where state contracts, subsidies, and ownership stakes favour politically connected Bumiputera elites. This arrangement both maintains political loyalty and diverts resources away from meritocratic redistribution or innovative sectoral development.

    Key Argument: The post-NEP ethnocracy continues to thrive under neoliberalism, which ironically delegitimises state redistribution while reinforcing state-backed rentier structures—creating a dual crisis of legitimacy and inequality.

    Reference: Gomez, E.T. et al. (2022). Malaysia’s Political Economy: Ownership and Control of Corporate Capital. ISEAS.

    Supporting Concept: Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution and hegemony through clientelism.

    1. Malaysia as a Semi-Peripheral Cog in the Global $114 Trillion Economy

    The IMF (August 2025) reports increasing geopolitical tensions, tariff risks, and stagnating multilateral trust in the global economy. Malaysia, with a GDP size constituting less than 0.3% of global output, finds itself trapped in the semi-periphery—dependent on FDI, vulnerable to external shocks, and constrained by domestic debt burdens and productivity stagnation.

    Key Argument: Despite its ambitions for high-income status, Malaysia is structurally subordinated to global capital flows and FDI conditions. Its policy room is narrowed not only by fiscal limitations but also by ideological surrender to neoliberal integration.

    Reference: IMF Blog, “New Standards for Economic Data,” July 2025. (https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/07/31/new-standards-for-economic-data-aim-to-sharpen-view-of-global-economy)

    Theoretical Base: Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Theory

    Conclusion: Towards a Post-Dependency National Strategy

    The 13MP will not succeed unless Malaysia dismantles its dependency logic—whether on U.S.-China supply chains, Big Tech’s infrastructural colonisation, or the institutional entrenchment of ethnocapital and comprador elites. Only through a radical re-imagining of national development priorities, with a return to social wage policies, public digital infrastructure, and class-based redistribution, can Malaysia reclaim agency from neoliberal-imperialist constraints.

    Linkages of Neoliberal Dependency in Malaysia: Capital Entrenchment & Global Tech Hegemony


  • Malaysia won’t bend to external pressure, says PM

    For example, if they (foreign powers) claim our bumiputra poli­cy is discriminatory, Malaysia firmly says no. The country stands by its accepted and esta­blished national policies

    This is an interesting one because there are usually two ways in which “discriminatory” is interpreted.

    The first is the standard free market response that foreign equity restrictions is discriminatory to foreign investors. This can easily be seen for the liberalism that it is so there’s not much to say.

    The second is a much more sophisticated and particular response unique to Malaysian political-economic history of “Bumiputera” (“Indigenous”) policies. The accusation of racial discrimination has extensive roots in the NGO-liberal discourse in Malaysia. I am thinking of writing more about it in the future but the jist of it is basically: “what if we import American racial liberalism into a context with no basis?” This is how you get USAID, NED and the US embassy funding “anti-racist” programmes in Malaysia. The irony is not lost for anyone with a brain here.

    … “In the procurement system, Malaysia must maintain the right to give opportunities to local companies. This is a non-negotiable position in our discussions.

    “Therefore, our negotiations with the United States are more meticulous and firmer than usual,” he said, dismissing those who questioned Malaysia’s stand on the US tariffs.

    In other news,

    Ballooning household debt in South-east Asia: The deindustrialisation trap in Malaysia

    The issue is of course that despite the efforts of the government through the New Industrial Masterplan 2030 or National Semiconductor Strategy, their ideological neoliberalism restricts valid policy and foresight to counter deindustrialisation. (Besides the aforementioned imperialist pressure.) Perhaps after the recession that will eventually happen neoliberalism will finally collapse under its own weight - or if the ardent neoliberals lose their political mandate. The grievances down below are steadily rising after all.


  • Southeast Asia and the ‘middle democracy’ trap

    TLDR: Liberals in Southeast Asia are much more sophisticated in hiding their class affinities than those in the West.

    the article with commentary

    In Brief

    The position of democracy in Southeast Asia has fluctuated since the Asian Financial Crisis, with democratic concerns gaining prominence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, particularly showcased in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. But a recent shift toward prioritising economic development over democratic values has been observed, largely due to changes in global politics and the retreat of the United States from democracy promotion, leaving Thailand as the only exception to this trend with its continued struggle for political reform.

    A familiar trope in the analysis of Southeast Asian politics is that development is a more urgent concern than democratisation. Popular pressures to increase democratic inclusion and protect democratic institutions may periodically arise. But the more fundamental and constant worry of Southeast Asia’s governments and citizens is thought to be making development—not democracy—work.

    For the Western observer who live their lives on the throne of the blood and skulls of the colonized, Global South aspirations of development seem idealistic and nonsensical. But when you have lived in the villages tucked away in the jungles, with no running water or electricity, it becomes real, not rhetorical - something material that needs changing.

    This was certainly true for the authoritarian regimes that dominated Southeast Asia throughout the Cold War period. Overcoming the historical hindrances and humiliations of colonialism meant that catching up with ‘the West’ or ‘the global North’ became the prime postcolonial imperative in anti-communist authoritarian regimes like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. They all dreamt of following in Japan’s development footsteps. It eventually became true in the reformed communist regimes of Vietnam and Cambodia as well. They sought to accompany China on its path from Second World to First.

    For a professor of political science, you seem to jumble your words. The anti-communist states of Southeast Asia were Third World - not Second - and only Singapore was the only country who wanted to uncritically ascend and claim to “First World”. Here is also where falling-back to a generalising “Southeast Asian” umbrella without addressing the specificities that characterise the political-economy of each country results in an analysis without the facts, or in other words, a writing without meaning.

    Yet in the quarter-century roughly following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, concerns about democracy came to loom much larger. A ‘regime cleavage’ within the elite and electorate alike thus came to characterise political competition in Southeast Asia’s wealthiest capitalist societies by the early 21st century.

    This was especially true in Indonesia, where an exceedingly punishing economic downturn undid Suharto’s personalistic dictatorship and ushered in a competitive multiparty democracy. Malaysia experienced a vicious crackdown on reformist forces in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, but reformist forces refused to fade. Thailand was no stranger to mass democratic protest—popular will prevailed over military rule in 1973 and 1992, with big assists from the widely beloved King Bhumipol Adulyadej. But the Asian Financial Crisis prompted constitutional reforms aimed at enhancing the electoral connection between voters and politicians.

    History to liberals marks semi-connected events portrayed to them by mainstream media without any sort of introspection, which is why they are always wrong, having only gotten 5% of the entire picture.

    After the wildly popular—and wildly unpopular—Thaksin Shinawatra was toppled in a 2006 coup, Thai politics fractured along the ‘yellow’ side of militarist, monarchist oligarchy and the ‘red’ side of inclusive and energetic populism. Malaysia saw questions of democratic reform rise in relevance with the launching of the Bersih movement for electoral integrity in that same year.

    Indonesia’s 2014 and 2019 elections seemed to hold democracy’s survival in the balance, with Joko Widodo the final rampart against strongman Prabowo Subianto’s ascendance to the presidency. Even in Singapore, the historically weak opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party gained headway in the 2010s largely by promising to constitute a solid procedural opposition in the city-state’s pseudo-democratic institutions.

    It would be a stretch to say that democracy had displaced development in the driver’s seat by the 2010s. Still, the fate of democracy certainly loomed larger in election campaigns in the first two decades of the 21st century than the final two decades of the 20th.

    Democracy in the Global South is a perpetual victim that needs saving from the United States - this I think more accurately characterises the article’s position than the idealistic bubble it tries to insulate itself with.

    But now, democracy is firmly back in the back seat. This is of course not merely a regional story. Donald Trump’s second, far more aggressively authoritarian presidency in the United States starting in early 2025 has taken democracy promotion entirely off the global agenda.

    This marks a definitive end to a global era. If democratic concerns are to play any meaningful role in any country’s politics, it can only be through domestic dynamics, not geopolitical pressure or transnational diffusion. The ‘democracy versus autocracy’ framing of world politics so favoured by US administrations from Bush to Biden is dead and buried.

    Perhaps an indirect admittance that colour revolution tactics elsewhere in the world failed to gained any sort of relevance in Southeast Asia. But regardless, this sort of “apolitical” “democracy promotion” throughout this article absolves the role of the United States in enacting economic siege on Southeast Asian economies, and blames the plight of under-development as merely inevitable. Will this lead to any thorough introspection of what democracy means beside the mainstream liberal understanding of “procedures”?

    I doubt it.

    Development is again sidelining democracy in Southeast Asia. The United States’ retreat from global leadership means that Southeast Asian nations will now maximise their economic ties to China, Europe and other Asian economies with less geopolitical hesitation. US tariffs on China will likely divert more lucrative investment projects to the region. As China begins transitioning from its unsustainable export-dependent economy to a domestic demand-driven growth model, Southeast Asian exporters will be first in line to feed the world’s most massive market.

    Indonesia and Malaysia are currently the most vivid examples of what happens when development sidelines democracy in national politics. Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election saw questions of democracy become almost entirely irrelevant. Prabowo’s nice-guy makeover allowed him to ride on Jokowi’s long coattails—lengthened by Indonesia’s strong economy—to a comfortable victory. In Malaysia, the opposition’s fight to displace the long-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition has produced a government which acts like it has no latitude to pursue deeper democratising reforms. At times it seems as if cost of living is the only political issue that matters in Malaysia, much like in neighbouring Singapore.

    How much does this guy make writing articles about how the poors care too much about living and not much about crossing a paper every 5 years?

    The fascinating exception to this trend is Thailand. Among Southeast Asia’s upper-middle-income countries, Thailand is at once the least democratic and the one where democracy still matters the most. Young voters in particular remain deeply committed to replacing the military–monarchy alliance with a far more democratic and inclusive political arrangement. In current times when external pressures for democratisation have evaporated, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian middle-income country where homegrown forces are pressing hard enough for a democratic breakthrough to threaten authoritarian elites’ entrenched interests.

    You mean the country that suffered the most under the Asian Financial Crisis, now poorer than China, dealing with multiple instabilities at its borders, is the country in which political mobilisation is much more established? Color me shocked!

    The lesson is an ironic one. When authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia stonewall on democratic reforms, they keep democracy at the forefront of the political agenda. When they concede even partial democratic reforms, politics is largely reduced to the quotidian demands of cost-of-living politics, which does not threaten political or economic elites in the slightest. The overall picture appears to be a ‘middle-democracy trap’ to accompany the ‘middle-income trap’.

    You all get paid to speak nonsense.

    which does not threaten political or economic elites in the slightest

    The irony is so painful it’s searing my eyeballs.

    The narrowing of political discourse between democracy and selective US foreign policy choices is about what I expected for the filth called the East Asian Forum. I critically support Amerikan (and in this case, Australian aswell) Academia in directly stunting and hampering effective countermeasures to Global South autonomy.

    Dan Slater is the James Orin Murfin Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan.

    Midwest freak needs to go fishing instead of wasting everyone’s time talking about topics outside their intellectual capability.



  • Vietnam as BRICS partner strengthens Southeast Asian, Global South voices

    some paragraphs removed for brevity

    Vietnam recently joined the BRICS as the group’s 10th partner country. Among member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Indonesia holds full membership in BRICS, while Malaysia and Thailand are official partner countries.

    This evolving trend underscores a gradual but notable shift among key Southeast Asian economies toward deeper engagement with alternative global governance platforms beyond the traditional Western-dominated order.

    Vietnam’s acceptance into BRICS as a partner country marks a significant development, which increases the likelihood of other ASEAN nations seeking BRICS membership and closer ties with the group.

    ASEAN member states’ growing interest in joining BRICS stems, in part, from geopolitical positioning. As ASEAN countries increasingly navigate a complex geopolitical landscape, seeking to balance relationships with major powers, BRICS offers an alternative platform for cooperation outside traditional Western-dominated structures.

    Another reason is the economic benefits the membership offers. It provides access to new markets, investment opportunities and technological advancements, which is particularly attractive for developing ASEAN economies.

    However, one of the main factors that may hinder the inclusion of other ASEAN countries in BRICS is the “US factor”. Some ASEAN countries maintain strong ties with the United States and may hesitate to deepen relations with BRICS to avoid a potential US backlash.

    While BRICS offers an alternative to Western-dominated global financial and governance structures, the calculus for some ASEAN countries is not merely economic, but deeply strategic. These countries often walk a tightrope between maximizing economic opportunities and preserving their established security and diplomatic alignments.

    In such contexts, the political-diplomatic cost of aligning more closely with BRICS can be high, especially when BRICS is increasingly perceived as a counterweight to Western hegemony and a challenger to the US-led global order. This is especially true for a country like the Philippines, whose foreign policy now under the present government very much lean toward the US.

    Moreover, Vietnam’s inclusion in BRICS as a partner country is highly significant in the evolving architecture of Global South cooperation. Vietnam’s presence expands BRICS’ geographic and developmental diversity.

    It represents a mid-sized, rapidly developing Southeast Asian economy that has successfully balanced socialist governance with market reforms. Its inclusion will, to some extent, elevate ASEAN’s visibility within BRICS, signaling a shift toward more inclusive multipolar leadership in the Global South.

    Its BRICS partnership enhances connectivity among the Belt and Road Initiative, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and potentially BRICS+financial cooperation, primarily through infrastructure finance via the New Development Bank, and cross-border settlement initiatives that reduce reliance on the US dollar.

    Likewise, Vietnam’s inclusion in BRICS symbolizes post-colonial economic autonomy. Vietnam’s history of anti-colonial struggle and post-war development success resonates strongly with other Global South nations.

    It stands as a symbol of resilience, economic self-determination, and the possibility of development without strict Western alignment or International Monetary Fund-style conditionalities. This enhances the normative narrative of BRICS as a platform for alternative development models beyond neoliberal prescriptions.

    Additionally, Vietnam’s inclusion reflects Hanoi’s balanced, nonaligned foreign policy that bridges ties with both East and West, aligning ASEAN’s outlook with BRICS-led Global South initiatives rooted in sovereignty and development-driven multilateralism.

    Vietnam’s BRICS partner status is more than symbolic — it is a strategic elevation of a Southeast Asian voice in reshaping global economic governance. It reinforces South-South cooperation and development, multipolarity, and a more equitable world order. It is also a subtle but strong message to the West: The Global South is organizing itself on its own terms.


  • The “Israel”-Singapore connection

    I would have written a much longer post, but I was brought to attention by this nifty post (archived link) by the “Israeli” trade mission to Singapore which sums it all up quite well:

    Singapore has a remarkable story to tell, and paradoxically this south east Asian city-state has quite a lot in common with [the Zionist Entity], a small nation with a history of struggle and resilience. The two small nations have populations comprised of immigrants [the Zionists admitted it themselves which is somewhat hilarious] with different cultures and customs, surrounded by large countries with their own political and ethnic tensions. Both of these small nations have managed against all odds to turn themselves in a single generation from poor, underdeveloped markets to global economic powerhouses with advanced infrastructures, skilled and highly educated workforces and ambitious entrepreneurs. Singapore has grown to become a global financial hub and an Economic giant in a single generation.

    The thing to realize is, what the anglophone Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore hate more than sinophone Chinese people, are the Muslims, but especially Malay-Muslims, who rejected their liberal secular capitalism. Their nation-building myths are quite similar, which justifies Singapore’s hefty military budget - larger than every other Southeast Asian country, both in per capita and absolute terms.

    A true liberation of the peoples of Southeast Asia necessitates the fall of the financial capitalists, chiefly represented by the largest banks in Southeast Asia, all based in Singapore. That’s why a lot of hysteria historically propagated here are based on “Indonesian” and “Malaysian” terrorists and supporters who’d like to see the downfall of “Singapore”. Nowadays, the rhetoric is a bit more muted, but echoes of this Islamophobia show-up from time to time.

    Christmas Eve, 1965, is the unofficial date of the start of the ‘love story’ between Israel and Singapore, an affair that was kept a deep, dark secret. The international press, like the Israeli media, tried to bring the tale to light. Occasionally, scraps of information leaked out; some were published, some were denied, many were disregarded. The fear that the ties would be terminated if they became public knowledge had its effect. Israel imposed a total blackout on the story and the secret was preserved.

    But ultimately the mysterious history between Israel and Singapore came to light. In his book, “From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000,” published in 2000, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father and its first prime minister, disclosed the secret that had been kept for almost 40 years: It was the Israel Defense Forces that established the Singaporean army. Lee wrote, “To disguise their presence, we called them `Mexicans.’ They looked swarthy enough.”

    To link it to a current news article: S’pore increased its security posture amid rising tensions from Iran-Israel conflict: Shanmugam

    People in this region, other regions, or extremist organisations might want to make a point against Israeli, American or other Western assets, he said, adding that there could be attacks from the far right on Muslim assets…

    If Singapore is ever attacked, it will make international headlines, he said. There is a possibility of attacks on both sides, he said, either by the far right attacking Muslims, or representatives of Muslim countries including Iran, and attacks on Western assets – American, European or Israeli.

    “So we have increased our security posture, working off different scenarios, but you know, you can never be absolutely sure,” he added.

    Israel-Hamas conflict a ‘reminder’ for Singapore that it has national interests at stake: Vivian Balakrishnan

    This quick ejaculation of “terrorism” when it comes to West Asian or Islamic related foreign policy remains a defining motto of the Singaporean government’s continual targeting of (Malay-)Muslim people, in a “we care about terrorism, but especially from the muslims” sense and also that of it would be “bad for business” since it would harm the hard-fought “social harmony”.

    “This episode is also a reminder to all Singaporeans that we do have our national interests at stake … We must reject terrorism in all its forms. No excuses, no ifs, no buts, no short-term political advantage. Reject terrorism. If attacked, all of us here must give the government of the day the ability to exercise the right of self-defence,” said Dr Balakrishnan, supporting the motion.

    “But even when it does so, we will expect the government of the day to uphold international law. And as Singaporeans, we will continue to extend humanitarian assistance and protection to all civilians. We should support the peaceful resolution of disputes. And we must nurture and protect our own precious cohesion and harmony.”

    The misused word “harmony” crops up again. Wonder if they’ll stop using this tired phrase. Clearly the harmony didn’t apply to those that didn’t fit into their vision of Western Modernity.

    And a quick note about the current Foreign Minister:

    I would say it is expected, and it is, but still embarrassing.



  • I find it funny how some Malaysian states banned the use of single-use plastics years ago and are planning to phase-out use nationally by 2030 but we continued to accept Western plastic waste.

    Malaysia will stop accepting U.S. plastic waste, creating a dilemma for California

    Malaysia will ban plastic waste imports from the U.S. starting Tuesday because of America’s failure to abide by the Basel Convention treaty on international waste transfers, in a move that could have significant consequences for California.

    Malaysia emerged as a major destination for U.S. waste after China banned American waste imports in 2018. California shipped 864 shipping containers, or more than 10 million pounds of plastic waste, to Malaysia in 2024, according to the Basel Action Network, an advocacy group. That was second only to Georgia among U.S. states.

    Malaysia to set stricter plastic import controls

    According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the country exported 35,316 tons of plastic scrap to Malaysia in 2024. United Nations Comtrade data shows that from 2021-2024, Malaysia received more plastic scrap imports from around the globe than any other non-OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) country.

    “Our people and environment in Malaysia have suffered greatly from the pollution caused by imported plastic and electronic waste,” says Wong Pui Yi, BAN researcher from Kuala Lumpur. “Other countries in Southeast Asia are likewise being harmed by foreign plastic waste daily. We sincerely hope that exporting countries will help us put a stop to waste dumping and trafficking.

    “But for these new regulations to be successful, the government must enforce them transparently, swiftly prosecute those who violate the law and close any loopholes that may arise, including clamping down on corruption. We must remain vigilant and continue to spot-check the system with intelligence-led searches and seizures.”


  • Mahathir is indeed unique in Malaysian politics, because he was the first Prime Minister to not be of royal origin and being born from peasants. As part of the up and coming Malay-Muslim bourgeoisie within UMNO, against the traditional British-aligned feudal bureaucrats back in the 60s and 70s, his firebrand speeches does seem quite anti-imperialist for those unaware. However, Malaysian foreign policy had already shifted east-ward and maintained this position since Tun Abdul Razak, where Mahathir was really just riding the coat tails of.

    I also do think generally his anti-semitism is usually overstated especially in Western media. It plays only a small role in the grand scheme of things.

    As for his Malay-Muslim supremacy, that’s a big one because for a lot of those on the left, the creation of the comprador Malaysian nation-state was already as right-wing as you can get, especially with the secession of Singapore. I have written before about the class forces that led to this secession, and so I won’t focus too much on it here but the reason I bring it up is that a lot of Malaysian liberals of any racial background, have this false idea that Mahathir was the main progenitor of racialism (racism), and that prior to his premiership there were little-to-no racial tension. This was definitely not the case.

    I’d say the key contributor to rising racial tension was the failure of left-wing parties and organizations to consolidate and gain power, and of course there is a ton of reasons for this, but just to name one example, Barisan Sosialis in the 60s and 70s were the premier left-wing party that was composed of a unity between Malay-Muslim farmers and Chinese labourers. Their fall lead to a resurgence and continuation of racial-baiting in the political scene and myopic race-based party decision-making.

    Furthermore, now to mention the liberals, they too had facilitated racialism within the country despite their pretentiousness and claims of being anti-racist. This is because of their misunderstanding of racialism and the causes of it within Malaysia - which has always been because of unequal land distribution, colonial-era relations of production and British-origin ideological divide and conquer.

    Now the liberals have built up quite a large propaganda machine that over-exaggerates racial difference and racial tensions to practically scare voters into voting for them. It’s two sides of the same coin.

    And so to call Mahathir right-wing because of his Malay-Muslim supremacism is really meaningless to those on the left here. A lot of the modern-day Malaysian political establishment and the many-many parties are right-wing by that definition, for none actually seek to reorganize the relations of production and actually end the root causes of racialism.



  • Agreed with practically everything you said. The AFC was definitely an engineered attack against SEA to disrupt EA-SEA integration, but interestingly enough I would say lead to the rise of labour organization and consciousness in Indonesia, with the presidentship of the progressive Abdurrahman Wahid, before his prompt ousting of course but that’s a different story.

    Although there are small details I’d contest.

    while instituting neoliberal mass privatizations to benefit his own cronies.

    He had quite a flip-floppy industrial policy but in his first couple terms he did pursue import-substitution industrialization, especially for transportation. Only in the later years did he then ran on a neoliberal platform (which lead to the rise of the current opposition party of PAS).

    socially conservative

    I don’t agree with the use of this phrase to describe Malaysian or Asian social beliefs because it mischaracterises the class positions and historical-cultural reasons for why populations in the Global South would seem “backward” compared to bourgeois-liberals in the West. (A lot of it is just Western chauvinism aswell).


  • Malaysia’s current geopolitical trajectory

    Sitting at one of the most important waterways in the world - the strait of Melaka, the country hosts the 2nd largest Chinese diaspora, 3rd largest Indian diaspora and largest Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Nepali diaspora. One thing to know is that Malaysian foreign policy never strays too far from home.

    It has now been a few years since the 2022 General Election, where a lot of the foreign alternative media was highlighting US influence in the opposition coalition and a potential westward turn. But unfortunately to them, lacking in dialectical materialism and influenced by Eurocentrism, they never actually understood the material and historical contexts that shape Malaysian politics.

    remainder

    To be clear, there is clear evidence of US involvement in aspects of the opposition. This is inevitable, Malaysia has a large professional English educated middle class owing to British colonization and many who aspire to be professional activists in the NGO industrial complex. The government’s continuation of colonial-era policies of unions and radical political organization meant that in modern-day Malaysian society there are really two avenues for those that want to be politically active: fall under the bureaucracy of parliamentary parties or go through ‘independent’ NGOs in “civil society”. However, this also implies that the past ruling coalition of nearly 50 years as somehow the anti-imperialist or atleast anti-US position. This isn’t the case.

    Brief background on Malaysian Foreign Policy

    Malaysian foreign policy has stayed remarkably consistent despite changes of government. This is due to the position of Malaysia in the global world economy, where through it’s colonial history and subsequent independence through build-up of native industries, it anchors Malaysian foreign policy and dissuades large changes. As such a lot of the country’s foreign policy hedges on free trade and ensuring domestic political stability and openness to foreign investment. This status-quo remains comfortable for most of the national bourgeoisie. That said, continual pressure from the diverse masses and popular classes ensure that the government could never take an outwardly pro-West position.

    In practical terms this means broad alignment with Global South and Islamic interests, despite the prevalence of comprador classes. This means a firm anti-Zionist stance, extensive economic and cultural co-operation with China, close historical and cultural ties with Indonesia and India, and engagements with internationalism through the Non-Aligned Movement and others. It has one of the most progressive foreign policies in Southeast Asia, or at-least in the ASEAN-5, especially concerning China.

    Back to the present

    The government is now in the process of drafting the 13th Malaysia Plan - the next 5-year plan for 2026-2030, which is when Malaysia is finally forecasted to reach high-income status according to World Bank classifications. This economic development is what I attribute to as the cause of the fracturing and instability of the Malaysian political scene - the fall of Barisan Nasional and rise of Pakatan Harapan and Perikatan Nasional. It represents a shift of power from the old ruling classes to the aspiring and modern national bourgeoise and petite-bourgeoisie, represented by the new or rising political parties, who grew and responded to an environment nearing the end of the Cold War, at the midst of neoliberalism’s establishment. The “radical change” as hoped and expected by the NGOs, Western and Alternative media never happened - which was to no one’s surprise except the liberals.

    The current government is currently pursuing a lot of fiscal reforms, while echoing neoliberal phrases that has become all too common. This isn’t especially new - this is merely a continuation of neoliberal policies since the 1990s, before any large changes within the Malaysian parliamentary scene. Generally, neoliberalism in the country has never taken a fully radical turn like that found in Argentina. For parts of the national bourgeoisie, privatization means a loss of their own class’s accumulation, and so neoliberalism trickles in targeting particular industries that maximizes their own racial-class gain. The so-called “third position” found in many semi-peripheral global south countries.

    The current Prime Minister does have more of an assimilationist foreign policy rhetorically, especially when compared to some of the previous prime ministers. It falls quite well in line to the coalition’s class base of “sensible” and “smart” (read “business friendly”) policymaking, but again this falls quite in line with past precedent of telling the West what it wants to hear but never actually acting on everything said. The “liberal reformer” seemingly is not much of a reformer after all - but he definitely fits the liberal bill though.

    To give another example, he echoes decades old refrains from neighbouring Singapore - whereby the Palestinian cause is “divisive” that threatens “social harmony”. The context of this is that there have been continuous protests and mobilizations for Palestine, especially after October 7th, with demonstrations infront of the US embassy in particular. Sometimes organized by left-wing organizations, sometimes by mainstream political parties - often by the new opposition after the liberals gained power (especially that of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia).

    This binary understanding of the role of religion and race is part and parcel of the government’s liberal minded coalition when it comes to racial relations - too simple, sometimes naive. Don’t mistake this rhetoric as being pro-Zionist though, for that is an untenable position in Malaysia. Just recently the Prime Minister emphasized the need to speak against Israeli aggression and crimes in Gaza and Iran and maintaining “centrality” (neutrality), not relying on any one country too much.

    What holds for the future?

    The so-called rise of “protectionism” has put Southeast Asian economies in a somewhat lucrative position through the China+1 strategy and others. This in effect has risen the trade and foreign investment with the US but it remains to be seen if this foreign investment can be sustained or will actually yield long-term benefits. Malaysia will continue straddling this neutral position, but for a majority of Malaysian policymakers, dealing with the US is merely an economic necessity, but does not hold any of the cultural, political or historical significance like it does with China. Over the longer term, Asian trade and investments will only continue to increase in relevance, with the flagship BRI project, the East Coast Rail Link, on track to finish by next year, bringing needed development to deprived east coast communities and enabling another potential rail link to Thailand.

    The Malaysian establishment’s continual acquiescence to Western Capital and unwillingness to be at the forefront of a Global South alternative will undoubtedly continue to roadblock further prosperity and harm the country when the middle-ground becomes impossible, giving further ammunition to those outside the current ruling coalition.

    To reiterate what I have wrote in the past, this means that Malaysia can only lean more East as time goes on. It is simply unfeasible for Malaysia to shift West. Economically, politically, culturally, and historically. Do not believe the “analysis” of those that have only stepped foot in this country to visit the beaches. All signs are leading to greater Eurasian and especially ASEAN integration.

    And to connect it to current events, having never recognized the Zionist Entity, the country has called the “Israeli Zionist regime” strikes on Iran a “flagrant violation of international law” but falls short of naming the key supporter of “Israeli” aggression, the US of A. Furthermore, Malaysia-Iran relations are friendly although minuscule. In the long-term, I do see growth as the US empire weakens due to both being Islamic countries and high potential for co-operation in many industries, but especially in oil and gas.