Here’s the opinion (it’s dogshit). Judge McFadden is not only a member of the Federalist Society but an ex-cop.

edit: relevant part of the decision (which cites the Encyclopedia Brittanica in the Year of Our Lᴏʀᴅ MMXXV lmao)

Next, that battery was direct evidence of discrimination that likely would not have occurred but for racial animus. Direct evidence is “a smoking gun,” Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988), “that itself shows racial or gender bias,” Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013). One “statement alone [that] is direct evidence” is enough to send a case to trial. Ayissi-Etoh, 712 F.3d at 576–77. “A[n action] that can plausibly be interpreted in two different ways—one discriminatory and the other benign—does not constitute direct evidence.” Braxton v. Walmart, Inc., 2023 WL 2028698, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 2023) (cleaned up).

Purposefully yanking on an Israeli flag tied around a Jewish person’s neck to choke them is direct evidence of racial discrimination. The Star of David—emblazoned upon the Israeli flag—symbolizes the Jewish race. Star of David, Encyclopedia Britannica (2025) (“The yellow badge that Jews were forced to war in Nazi-occupied Europe invested the Star of David with a symbolism indicating martyrdom and heroism.”).^[1] Battery, particularly involving a racial symbol, is strong evidence of racial discrimination. Cf. Wong, 450 Fed. App’x at 28–29 (racially motivated battery violated § 1981). It is more severe than “[r]acial slurs or statements” that constitute direct evidence. E.g., Ayissi-Etoh, 712 F.3d at 576. And targeting the Star of David is as racially motivated as “the highly offensive racial slur, ‘n*****,’” which “constitutes direct evidence.” Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration added) (collecting cases); see also Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 186 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding direct evidence when employers said an employee was “too black to do various tasks” or explicitly refused to “hire a black person”).

Ali has proffered no “benign” interpretation whatsoever for choking Sumrall and it is hard to imagine one. Braxton, 2023 WL 2028698, at *3. Her closest argument contends that the Israeli flag represents the state of Israel rather than the Jewish race, so her action is merely anti- Israel, not antisemitic. PI Hr’g Tr. at 74:23–76:1. But it is quite a stretch to say that yanking on a flag tied around someone’s neck is an objection to state policies; battery is not a legitimate form of protest. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (“[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.”). Ali did not have reason to think Sumrall was herself affiliated with the Israeli government. Rather, it is much more likely that she was intentionally attacking a Jewish person wearing a Jewish flag as a symbol of her racial heritage. As Sumrall’s counsel contended at the preliminary injunction hearing, if yanking on a flag emblazoned with the Star of David tied around a Jewish person’s neck at a pro-Israel protest is not discrimination, "I don’t know what is.” PI Hr’g Tr. at 83:3–5 (arguments of counsel).