A US Air Force F-35 pilot spent 50 minutes on an airborne conference call with Lockheed Martin engineers trying to solve a problem with his fighter jet before he ejected and the plane plunged to the ground in Alaska earlier this year, an accident report released this week says.
What is a mistake, and one more and more likely to be made, is the priotizing and full entrusting of those sensors. A sensor has existed for 50 years, but the software made in such a way that overriding is impossible. Or without overriding, why does “on the ground” mode stop the full fly-by-wire controls of the aircraft? Should just continue to work anyways for touch and go regardless of how many sensors say something. Ridiculous that it doesn’t. This means that this was a missed safety condition in development, or one that was accepted without noticing the likelihood that it would happen given the maintenance procedures (procedures and the parties that will perform actions are ALSO part of any good safety analysis). So maintenance failures are still something that should reflect on performance in a system. It’s not separable
What is a mistake, and one more and more likely to be made, is the priotizing and full entrusting of those sensors. A sensor has existed for 50 years, but the software made in such a way that overriding is impossible. Or without overriding, why does “on the ground” mode stop the full fly-by-wire controls of the aircraft? Should just continue to work anyways for touch and go regardless of how many sensors say something. Ridiculous that it doesn’t. This means that this was a missed safety condition in development, or one that was accepted without noticing the likelihood that it would happen given the maintenance procedures (procedures and the parties that will perform actions are ALSO part of any good safety analysis). So maintenance failures are still something that should reflect on performance in a system. It’s not separable